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ESTATE PLANNING IN FLORIDA:
THE REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST
JAmms

S. Ron,*

INThODUCION

Judicious planning of an estate of any appreciable size requires consideration of 'the use of a revocable inter vivos trust. These trusts have
been the source of extensive litigation, and each jurisdiction has developed its own peculiarities in the area. Before recommending and
drafting a revocable inter vivos trust, the attorney must be thoroughly
familiar with the interpretation given to such trusts in the jurisdiction
whose laws are to govern the particular trust arrangement. This article
will explore a number of peculiarities in the Florida law pertaining to
revocable inter vivos trusts.
The alternatives to the use of a revocable inter vivos trust are: a
testamentary trust or non-trust gift, an inter vivos non-trust gift,1 and an
irrevocable inter vivos 'trust.2 Only the revocable inter vivos trust and
the testamentary gift remain ambulatory in nature and allow the donor
to retain some degree of control over the property during his lifetime.
Without attempting to examine all of the factors relevant to the
choice of the form a gift should take, the advantages of the use of a
revocable inter vivos trust may be summarized as follows:
(1) the settlor can test the competency and discretion of the
trustee who will manage the property after the settlor's death;
(2) management of the property will not be interrupted by the
death of the settlor;
(8) if the settlor becomes incompetent to manage his own property, management has been established under the trust, and no
guardian or conservator need be appointed;
(4) court supervision of the trust may be avoided;
(5) the assets in such a trust will not be part of the settlor's
probate estate and thus possibly may be available to the ultimate
3
beneficiaries at an earlier date;
* B.S. 1959, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of
Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1962, Harvard University; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.
1. Such gifts may take various forms including: a gift of personal property inter
vivos, as opposed to a gift causa mortis; a gift of a present interest; a gift of a future
interest; or a gift of a concurrent interest. See generally CAsNmR, ESTATE PLANmNIN
267-79 (3d ed. 1961).
2. See generally CASNER, EsTATE PLANNNG 148-266 (3d ed. 1961).
3. The word "possibly" is used because the extent of the trustees potential
personal liability for federal estate taxes arising from premature distributions to
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(6) publicity attendant to probate will be avoided;
(7) ancillary administration for assets physically located in another jurisdiction maybe avoided;
(8) the total expenses of administration of the estate and trust
will usually be less if the probate estate is reduced;
(9) during and after the settlor's lifetime, his creditors will have
more difficulty reaching trust property than non-trust property;
(10) from and after the settlor's death, it will be more difficult
for the wife of the settlor to assert her marital rights against trust
property than non-trust property;
(11) contesting heirs will find it more difficult to upset a long
established trust than a will;
(12) there may be favorable federal 4 or state tax considerations;
and
beneficiaries depends upon whether 48 Stat. 760 (1934), 31 U.S.C. §192 (1958)
applies to trustees as vell as executors. See Alexander, PersonalLiability of Executors
and Trustees for Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxes, 9 TAx L. RBv. 1 (1953).
4. The general rules of federal taxation that will apply to the majority of
revocable inter vivos trust arrangements may be summarized as follows:
During the life of the settlor, the income from the trust will be included in the
settlor's gross income. hr. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§676, 677. After the death of
the settlor, the trust will constitute a separate tax entity.
The trustee's basis in the property during the life of the settlor will be the
settlor's basis. INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, §1014. After the death of the settlor, the
trustees basis will be the fair market value of the property at the date of the
settlor's death or on the alternate valuation date. INr. RE:v. CODE OF 1954, §1014.
During the life of the settlor, the trustees holding period for capital gains purposes will begin on the date the settlor acquired the property. INT. REv. COp, OF
1954, §1223 (2). Although there is no statutory, judicial or administrative authority
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Professor Casner indicates that the
trustee's holding period is unaffected by the death of the settlor. CAsNER, ESTATE
PLANNwG 126 (3d ed. 1961). Compare G.C.M. 19347, 1938-1 GCM. BULL. 218 and
Fifth Ave. Bank v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 428 (Ct. Cl. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 820 (1942) for a discussion of the holding period of capital assets under §117
of the Revenue Act of 1934.
The value of the trust property on the date of death of the settlor, or on the
alternate valuation date, will be included in his gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2038. Some items subject to disposition by the
testator may be includible in his gross estate only if they pass through his probate
estate. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § §2039, 2042. It is not settled whether payment
of these items to the trustee of a revocable inter vivos trust will avoid their inclusion
in the testators gross estate. See CAsNER, EsTATE PLANNMG 128-30 (3d ed. 1961).
No gift will be made by the settlor for federal gift tax purposes except to the
extent that the income or corpus of the trust is paid to one other than the settlor. See
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-2(c) (1961).
Such a trust may be used to avoid the attribution rules of NT. REV. CoDE oF
1954, §318(a) (2) (A), that apply between the estate and beneficiaries. Thus, if an
intended beneficiary and the testator own stock in the same close corporation, attribution of the beneficiary's stock to the estate-should the estate desire to redeem the
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(13) generally, the settlor can select more freely the jurisdiction
in which he desires to have his trust administered as well as the
jurisdiction whose laws he wishes to govern his dispositive arrangement. This feature may be of particular importance to Florida residents because of the uncertainty of the Florida law concerning many
aspects of the inter vivos trust.
The disadvantages of an inter vivos trust arrangement may be summarized as follows:
(1) a federal stamp tax is payable with respect to the securities
transferred to the trust;6
(2) additional expense of a trustees fee may be incurred during
the settlor's lifetime;
(3) a significant distribution fee will be incurred if and when a
corporate trustee distributes assets in the trust;
(4) additional records and tax returns must be kept and filed;
(5) there may be adverse federal 6 and state tax considerations.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that the position of the Florida
courts is not definitive in many areas considered in the following pages.
Because this article is directed to the problems of estate planning, rather
than litigation, assumptions and conclusions as to the state of the law
and its probable course of development in Florida will necessarily be
propounded from a conservative point of view.

stock-would be avoided if the particular stockholder beneficiary were eliminated as
a devisee or legatee and instead made a beneficiary of such a trust.
See generally CAsNER, EsrAx PLANNwG 120-34 (3d ed. 1961).
5. INT.lxv. CODE OF 1954, §4321.
6. If substantially all the settlor's property is placed in a revocable inter vivos
trust, the advantages of using his estate as a separate tax entity will be lost. Such
advantages include: (1) The $600 exemption available to estates. INr. REV. CoD
OF 1954, §642(b); (2) The use of certain administrative expenses as deductions
against estate income rather than the estate tax. See INr. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§642(g); See also CAsxna, EsTrx PLANNING 122 n.83 (3d ed. 1961); (8) The
avoidance of the "throwback rule" which applies to trusts but not estates. INT. E"V.
CODE OF 1954, §§665-68; and (4) The ability of an executor, but not a trustee, to
be discharged from personal liability under IxEHNA. RmrmuE CoDE OF 1954,
§2204. But see note 3 supra.
If stock in a closely held corporation is transferred to a trust, the corporation
will no longer be able to avail itself of the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. See INT. RaY. CODE OF 1954, §1871; Treas. Reg. §1.18711(e) (1959).
See generally CAsmm, ESTATE PLANmG 120-36 (3d ed. 1961).
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POUR-OVER OF PROPERTY FROM T=E SErrLo'S WiL.
TO THE REvocABLE INTE Vrvos TRUST

Pour-oversin General
Rejection of an attempted pour-over 7 from a will to an inter vivos
trust is often based upon the conclusion that the pour-over is a testamentary disposition, and it does not meet the requirements of the Statute
of Wills 8 because the trust instrument has not been executed with the
requisite formalities. In the absence of statute, some courts have sanctioned such pour-overs on the basis of 'the doctrine of incorporation (of
the trust instrument) by reference or the doctrine of independent significance (of the trust itself) .9
The issue arises in the context of various trust arrangements. If the
trust is irrevocable and not subject to amendment, the pour-over can be
supported by either doctrine.10 If the inter vivos trust is revocable but
has not been revoked or amended, the rationale that would support a
pour-over to an irrevocable inter vivos trust would seem to be equally
applicable." The concepts give the courts the most difficulty when a
revocable, amendable inter vivos trust has been amended or partially
revoked after the execution of the settlor's will. The ability to make a
testamentary disposition to an entity that existed at the time of the
execution of the will may still be supported on the rationale of incorporation by reference.' 2 But what of a disposition pursuant to the terms
of the trust instrument as amended, when the amendment is executed
after the execution of the testator's final will and does not comply with
the requirements of the Statute of Wills? 13 Clearly, the requirements of
incorporation by reference-that the unattested instrument be in existence at the time the will is executed and be referred to in the will as an
existing instrument-cannot be met. In the absence of statute, only two
courts have taken the view that the pour-over may operate under the
7. By will, one may make specific bequests, or leave the residue of his estate to
the trustee of a living trust to be distributed in accordance with the terms of the
trust instrument. Thus, testamentary assets may "pour-over" to an inter vivos trust.
See BoGEaT, TnuSTS §22 (3d ed. 1956).
8. The Florida counterpart of the Statute of Wills is FLA. STAT. §731.07 (1961).
9. See RESTATEmNT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §54 (1959); 1 Scorr, Tnusrs §§54.1,
54.2 (24 ed. 1956).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),

TRusTS §54 comment g (1959); 1 ScoTT,

TnusTS §54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
11. See RESTATmMNT (SEcoND), TnusTS §54 comment h (1959); 1 ScoTr,
TRusTS §54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
12. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920
(1935).
13. In 1 Scott, Thusrs §54.3 (2d ed. 1956), it is stated, "Where the inter vivos
trust is amended by instruments which comply with the formalities required for the
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trust as amended. 14 These two decisions are based on the sound rationale
that the trust, as amended, is a fact of significance independent of its
effect on the will. In recent years there has been a move by various state
legislatures to give a definitive answer to the pour-over problem.' 5
In Florida, before 1959, the validity of pour-overs to amended revocable inter vivos trusts had not been decided by the courts.' 6 In 1959,
the Florida legislature adopted a liberal approach to the matter when it
enacted Florida Statutes section 736.17 which permits a pour-over from
a will to an inter vivos trust even though the trust is amended after the
execution of the will. If there is a subsequent amendment, the pour-over
property is permitted to pass under the amended trust. The statute, as
amended in 1961, is set out in full in the Appendix.
In some states the question arises whether and to what extent an inter
vivos trust that receives a pour-over from a will, shall be supervised by a
court. After the pour-over has operated, three variant approaches are
possible: a single non-court trust exists; a single court trust has been
established; or although the inter vivos trust, as it existed prior to the
death of the testator, is a non-court trust, the property poured-over from
the will creates a new and separate court trust . 7 Florida Statutes section
786.17 unequivocally provides that the trust shall be treated as a single
non-court trust unless the will manifests a contrary intention.' s
execution of wills, it would seem clear enough that the policy underlying the Statute
of Wills is complied with, and that the property disposed of by the will should pass
in accordance with the terms of the inter vivos trust as amended, even though the
amendments were made after the execution of the will. In such a case it is not
necessary to resort either to the doctrine of incorporation by reference or to the
doctrine as to facts of independent significance." (Footnotes omitted.)
Professor Casner points out that, "If the revocable inter vivos trust is executed
with the formalities of a will . . .it may be a will for all purposes and may have to
be probated like any other will. Thus many of the advantages of creating a revocable
inter vivos trust will be lost." CAsNim, EsTATE PLANwnG 1580 (answer to problem
5.2) (1961).
14. Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961); Second
Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 368, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960); cf.
Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725 (1958).
15. At this time, thirty states have enacted such "pour-over" statutes. These
statutes are set out in 1 P-H WJrns, EsTATEs AND Tnusvs 1003. Most of the
statutes provide that the property may pass under the trust as amended.
16. In Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1956) the beneficiaries of
the original trust attempted to question the will's incorporation of an amendment to
the trust executed on the same date as the settlor's will. The question was left unanswered because the complaint failed to allege that the trust was amended after
the execution of the will and that the amendment was not executed in accordance
with the Statute of Wills. This case is noted in 10 U. FLA. L. BEv. 108 (1957).
17. See CASNER, EsTATE PLANNo 147 (3d ed. 1961).
18. FLA. STAT. §736.17(5) (1961), see APPENDIX; of. FLA. STAT. §37.24
(1961).
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Pour-overto an Unfunded Trust
Unfortunately, section 736.17 leaves unanswered the question: Will
an unfunded or nominally funded revocable inter vivos trust qualify as
the subject of a pour-over from the testator's will? The settlor may
create a separate "unfunded" trust, that is, he may convey no property
to the trustee; or he may create a "nominally funded" trust, for example
ten dollars in cash could be placed in the trust. The settlor may execute
such an instrument with the idea that he will, at some future time during
his life, convey additional property to the trustee; or the settlor might
create an unfunded trust merely to avoid the necessity of setting forth
the terms of the trust in his will. Another reason for creating an unfunded trust might be that the settlor contemplates the probability that
he might wish to change the dispositive provisions of the trust at a later
date. He may conclude that the use of a separate trust, as opposed to
setting forth the trust provisions in his will, will facilitate future amendments because such amendments need not be executed with the formalities required by the Statute of Wills, whereas a change in the provisions
of his will would require a formal codicil. The question presented is
whether this conclusion will be upheld by the Florida courts: Must a
subsequent amendment to an unfunded or nominally funded trust that is
to be the recipient of the settlor's devise or bequest be executed with
the same formalities as a will or does such an amendment come within
the provisions of section 736.17?
Subsection (2) (d) expressly permits a pour-over to a trust, the res
of which consists of "the possible expectancy of receiving benefits as
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy deposited, or to be deposited with the trustee."19 The statute is silent on the matter of an
unfunded or nominally funded trust that is not the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy. Initially, it would seem that the mention of this specific
type of trust, commonly referred to as an unfunded insurance trust,
would indicate that the Florida legislature did not intend to sanction
pour-overs to unfunded trusts generally.
The statute provides that a bequest or devise may be made to the
trustees of a trust that is evidenced "by a written instrument subscribed
concurrently with the making of the will... ." Since a period of time
after the execution of a trust instrument is usually required for the final
conveyance of various properties to the trust, the wording of the statute
would seem to recognize the validity of a trust not funded at the time of
the execution of the will. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the
statute could be interpreted as contemplating
the existence of such a
20
trust res at the date of the settlor's death.
19. FLA. STAT. §786.17(2) (d) (1961), see APPENDIX.
20. Cf. Clark v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A.2d 108 (1955)
wherein the trust instrument was in existence when the will was executed but was
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A pour-over to an unfunded trust can be supported in sound legal
theory. Because no trust exists there is no fact of independent significance; but a trust instrument does exist, and this instrument may be
incorporated into the testator's will by reference. 2 1 If the unfunded trust
has been amended after the execution of the settlor's will, a disposition
pursuant to the terms of the trust as amended cannot be supported solely
by the doctrine of incorporation by reference or by the doctrine of independent significance.
Since there are neither cases nor any other statutes in Florida pertaining to such trusts, an examination of their treatment in other jurisdictions may aid in predicting the efficacy of their use in Florida. There
seems to be no reported case in this country involving a pour-over to an
22
unfunded trust that was not the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.
There is, however, abundant judicial authority supporting trusts, the
only assets of which are life insurance policies.2 Generally, the courts
have little difficulty in upholding these insurance trusts. The expectancy
of receiving life insurance proceeds is a "peculiar" type of property arising out of the contract. 24 Maturation of the life insurance policy is no
more a testamentary disposition because the proceeds are paid to the
beneficiary as trustee than if payable to him absolutely. 25
26
Thirty states have recently enacted statutes sanctioning pour-overs.
The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act,27 not only sanctions
pour-overs to unfunded life insurance trusts, but permits a pour-over to
a trust, "regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of
the trust." Although the enactment of section 736.1728 antedates the
promulgation of the Uniform Act, their general import and actual wording are similar in many respects, yet the Florida statute makes no mention of unfunded trusts in general.
It would be desirable for the Florida legislature to amend section
736.17 by inserting a provision similar to that found in the Uniform Act,
or indeed by enacting the Uniform Act itself, which would permit the
use of any unfunded trust as a receptacle for a pour-over from the
settlor's will. Such trusts would enable the settlor to retain absolute
not funded until after the execution of the will, though before the death of the
testator. The court held that the attempted pour-over failed.
21. 1 Sconr, Thusrs §54.3 (2d ed. 1961).
22. But cf. Sapp v. Protheroe, 77 S.D. 72,85 N.W.2d 505 (1957).
23. See I ScoTrT, TRusTs §57.3 (2d ed. 1956).
24. See Milam v. Davis, 98 Fla. 202, 123 So. 668 (1929).
25. See I Scorr, Thusrs §57.3 (2d ed. 1956).
26. See note 14 supra.
27. Uniform State Laws Ann. 87-88 (Supp. 1961). The Uniform Act has been
enacted in the following states at this time: Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.
28. See APPENDIX.
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ownership of property during his life, and at the same time allow additional flexibility in his dispositive arrangement. However, until the
Florida legislature or judiciary has definitively established the validity
of a pour-over to an unfunded or nominally funded trust, it would seem
manifestly imprudent to invoke such an arrangement in Florida.
Tim lEvocA a.

INTER Vivos TRUST AS A
NONTESTAMENTAnY DIsPOSITON

The sine qua non of an operative pour-over pursuant to section
786.1729 is the existence of a trust. However, the statute leaves unanswered the paramount question: What constitutes a valid trust in Florida? Thus, if a will directs a pour-over to an ostensibly inter vivos trust
that is, in fact, nonexistent, or that is a testamentary trust lacking the
requisite formalities, the pour-over provision will be nugatory and the
property in the purported inter vivos trust will fall back into the residue
of the testator's estate.
Prerequisite to the use of an inter vivos trust, and a fortiori a pourover thereto, is a critical analysis of the factors that will prompt the
courts to invalidate an allegedly inter vivos trust. Confutation can be
based on one or more of the following theories:
(1) no trust was created;
(2) no trust arose until the death of the settlor;30 or
(8) the conveyance, though effective during 'the lifetime of the
settlor, is a testamentary disposition of the remainder and thus void
if there is a failure to comply with the wills statutes. 3 '
An examination of these three theories follows.
No Trust Was Created
Objection on this theory can usually be averted by careful drafting of
the trust instrument. If Florida realty is to be conveyed in trust a written
instrument is required. 32 A trust of personalty can, however, be established by parol.3 3 No formal words are necessary to create a trust,34 but
29. Ibid.
30. RFsTATEmrENT (SEcoND), TnusTs §56 (1959); 1 ScoTr, ThusTs §§56-56.7
(2d ed. 1956).
31. RESTATmEr (SEcoND), TnusTs §57 (1959); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§57-57.6
(2d ed. 1956).
32. FLA. STAT. §689.05 (1961).
83. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Tunnicliffe, 104 Fla. 683, 140 So. 806 (1982); Bay

Biscayne Co. v. Baile, 73 Fla. 1120, 75 So. 860 (1917). Note however, that a will
cannot pour-over to a trust not evidenced by a written instrument. See APPENDIX.
34. Walker v. Close, 98 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521 (1929).
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a clear intention must be expressed. 35 The Florida Supreme Court has
repeatedly announced that the concurrence of three circumstances is
imperative to the creation of a trust: 36 sufficient words to manifest the
grantor's intention to raise a trust; a definite subject matter;37 and a
certain and identifiable object or beneficiary.
A trust will not fail for want of a trustee named in the instrument. 38
Conversely, a trust will not arise merely because the words "trustee" or
"as trustee" are added to the name of the grantee.3 9 A trust will not arise
if a person is at the same time the trustee and beneficiary of the identical
interest.40 A trust in realty will be executed by the Statute of Uses if it is
41
a mere dry or passive trust.
If No Trust Arises Until the Settlo's Death or the Remainder
Over on the Settlor's DeathIs Testamentary
It may be difficult, if not impossible, to draft an instrument that will
foreclose an attack on these grounds, and at the same time, substantially
comply with the settlor's desires. The settlor's retention of excessive
dominion and control over the trust property is usually the provocation
for both of these objections. Presumably because of this common genesis, many courts, including the Florida Supreme Court, often do not
precisely articulate the theory of their analysis.
A trust will not arise during the settlor's lifetime, if he fails to make
an effective inter vivos conveyance to the trustee or if no interest passes
to any beneficiary. 42 An inter vivos conveyance may effectively divest
the grantor of legal title during his life and nevertheless be deemed a
35. Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d

400 (1945).
86. E.g., Axtell v. Coons, 82 Fla. 158, 89 So. 419 (1921); Byrne Realty Co. v.
South Florida Farms Co., 81 Fla. 805, 89 So. 318 (1921); Bay Biscayne v. Baile, 73
Fla. 1120, 75 So. 860 (1917); Floyd v. Smith, 59 Fla. 485, 51 So. 537 (1910).
37. In Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51, 73 (1853), the court stated, "where the
intended subject matter or disposition consists of an indefinite part or quantity, the
bequest fails for uncertainty- . . . gifts of a 'handsome gratuity,' 'some of my best
linen," 'a part of my land,' and numerous other gifts of similar import, have been held
void."
38. Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887 (1928).
39. FLA.STAT. §689.07 (1961), Willey v. W. J. Hogson Corp., 90 Fla. 343, 106
So. 408 (1925).
40. See, e.g., Huggins v. Whitaker, 100 Fla. 600, 129 So. 857 (1930); Montgomery v. Carlton, 99 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930); Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112
So. 846 (1927).
41. See, e.g., McGiff v. McGill, 62 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1952); Deauville Corp. v.
Blount 157 Fla. 322, 25 So. 2d 812 (1946); Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193
So. 54 (1940). See also FLA.STAT. §689.09 (1961).
42. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRusTS §56 comment a (1959); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS
§56 (2d ed. 1956).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

9

THE REVOCABLE
INTER VIVOS
Florida Law Review,
Vol. 16, TRUST
Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 2

testamentary disposition because of his inordinate retention of dominion
and control over the property during his lifetime, indicating that a mere
43
agency arrangement was intended.
It is well settled that possession by the settler of a power to revoke or
modify the trust will not make the trust testamentary. 4 4 Nor will the
reservation of the income for life nullify the remainder.4 5 The result
46
should be the same if the settlor has custody of both of these powers.
Only when the settlor reserves additional dominion over the trust
is the
47
testamentary character of the disposition called into question.
In most cases in which such trusts are nullified because of the settlor's
reservation of undue control, the results are based on the cumulative
effect of the retention of numerous powers rather than the possession of
any single power. This makes the analysis especially difficult and the
retention of multifarious powers particularly hazardous in jurisdictions,
such as Florida, where the cases in point are rather exiguous.
Only five reported Florida cases touch on the issue in question. The
flrst case, Smith v. Hines,4 8 involved not a trust, but an inter vivos transfer of several slaves just before the testator's death. The Florida Supreme
Court, in upholding the testators widow's claim of dower49 in these
slaves, stated, 50
we are forced to infer, from these facts, that said [testator] never
parted with the absolute dominion over said slaves during his
life; and that said conveyance was but a mere device or contrivance, to be used at his death, to keep his widow from her
dower. We, therefore, declare it ineffectual against her.
43. RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TRusTs §57 text following comment b, illus. 3
(1959); 1 Scorr, TRusIs §57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
44. RlESTATEMNNT (SECOND), TRuSTS §57 comment a (1959); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS
§57.1 (2d ed. 1956).
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. See 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §57.2 (2d ed. 1956). If only possession and not title is
transferred, with instructions to hold and deal with the property as the transferor
directs and on death to deliver to a third person, the transferee is not a trustee, but
merely an agent for the owner. The agency terminates with the death of the owner
and the disposition is testamentary and invalid because of failure to comply with
the Statute of Wills. The result would not be changed merely because legal title
vests in the agent. The agent is a trustee, but the difference between an independent
trustee and one who is also an agent is recognized in the decisions.
In the original RESTATEmENT, TnUSTS §57 (1935), the amount of control
reserved by the settlor was the sole consideration. However, if the trust is evidenced
by a formal instrument the policy of the Statute of Wills has been complied with.
48. 10 Fla. 258 (1863).
49. In 1863, as today, a widow was entitled to dower in personalty owned by
her husband at the time of his death, as well as in realty. See FLA. STAT. §731.34
(1961).
50. 10 Fla. at 298.
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The court noted that the testator and his estate received the proceeds
from the resale of two of the slaves after the testator's alleged sale of
the slaves to his father. The court stated that fraud could be inferred
from the retention of possession of the "goods" and the failure of the
testator to part with the absolute dominion over the "property" during
his lifetime.
The holding of the court was based partially on the failure to record
the contract of sale and failure to show consideration. However, the
case would seem more appropriately classified as one that repudiated an
allegedly inter vivos transfer because of the conclusion that a mere
agency agreement was intended. The full implications of the case are
obscured by the predominant fact that the transfer involved a fraud on
the wife's dower rights. In a later case5 l the Florida Supreme Court,
although upholding the validity of an inter vivos trust against the
settlor's widow's
claim of dower, distinguished Smith v. Hines on the
52
grounds that,
it appears that the husband designed by subterfuge to deprive
his wife of her dower rights when she was not properly provided
for from his property. In this case the wife is amply provided
for, and the husband created a trust in good faith for a laudable
purpose, by a written instrument sufficient to impose a trust upon
personal property delivered to the trustee.
Thus the implication to be drawn from this latter case is that, absent the
issue of fraud on the widow's rights, Smith v. Hines is not dispositive of
'the question of the effect of excessive reservation of control.
Not until 1914 did the Florida Supreme Court again have an opportunity to speak on the issue. In Johns v. Bowden 53 the testator had conveyed his homestead in trust reserving a life interest with the right to
occupy the land and appropriate the rents, certain administrative powers
including the right to collect rents, and a lifetime power to appoint by
deed. In holding the inter vivos conveyance to be in reality a testamentary disposition of homestead, the court stated,5 4
In effect the entire beneficial interest and right in the specific
property remained in the grantor, and could not pass at all, without his consent, till after his death, thus making the trust deed not
an absolute conveyance of a vested right in praesenti,of the property alleged to be homestead. [Citations omitted.] Because of the
51. Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815, rehearing denied 120 Fla.
258, 162 So. 808 (1935).
52. Id. at 258, 158 So. at 818.
53. 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914).
54. Id. at 47, 66 So. at 159.
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retention of the entire beneficial estate in the grantor during his
life, the instrument in practical effect, is in the nature of a testamentary disposition of property alleged to be homestead ....
The court analyzed this conveyance as ineffective to pass any interest
until the death of the settlor. The trust instrument in fact specified thd
devolution of the property in default of an inter vivos appointment by
the settlor. Thus the beneficiaries in default of appointment immediately
acquired a vested future interest, albeit subject to divestment by exercise of the power. The only rationale that could support the decision is
that the overabundant retention of powers by the settlor indicated a
mere agency agreement was intended. It is doubtful that the court would
have reached such a conclusion had the homestead rights55 of the
settlor's surviving children not been in issue.
In Williams v. Collier50 the Florida Supreme Court denied the
settlor's widow dower in bonds that the settlor had transferred to an
irrevocable 57 inter vivos trust. The instrument provided that the bonds
were to remain the property of the settlor subject to the consummation
of the trust. After that time the only interest retained by the settlor was
a life interest in the income. The court also interpreted the instrument
as reserving to the settlor during his life the right to name another
trustee on the death of the designated trustee.58
55. FLA. CONST. art. X, §6; See also FIA. STAT. §781.27 (1961).
56. 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815, rehearing denied 120 Fla. 258, 162 So. 868
(1935).
57. The trust instrument provided, "...
it being expressly understood that said
bonds shall remain the property of the said [settlor] in accordance with the terms of
this instrument and subject only to the consummation of the trust herein created.
• . . In the event of the death of the Trustee before the execution of this trust, or at
any time prior thereto during the pleasure of said [settlor] and at his option, this
instrument shall become inoperative and concurrent therewith the said bonds shall
be forthwith returned to said [settlor]." 120 Fla. at 251-52, 158 So. at 816.
In answer to the assertion that the settlor had retained the power to revoke the
trust, the court stated, "The reserved power to require redelivery of the bonds to
the trustor in either of the events stated, has reference to the administration of the
trust, and not to a revocation of the trust.... 120 Fla. at 260, 162 So. at 869.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denckla, apparently misinterpreted
the facts of Williams o. Collier,when it stated, "[In Williams v. Collier] we upheld
a revocable trust reserving a life interest to the settlor, with remainder payable to
named grandchildren...
100 So. 2d 878, 883 (Fla. 1956). (Emphasis added.)
In 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 266, 267 (1958), the author misinterpreted the facts when
he cited Williams v. Collierfor the proposition that, "The settlor may, in the absence
of statutory prohibition, reserve the power to amend or revoke in whole or in part at
any time without making the trust illusory."
In 1 Scoi-r, TnRusTS §57.5 n.3 (2d ed. 1956), the Williams v. Collier trust is
recognized as being irrevocable.
58. 120 Fla. at 257, 158 So. at 818.
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Again the court apparently viewed the issue as one involving the
passing of an interest before the death of the settlor when it stated, 0
"the reservation of the interest on the bonds during his life, did not
affect the passing of title to the principal of the bonds from the maker
of the trust to the trustee for the beneficiaries of the trust ... ." The
Smith v. Hines on the ground of the good faith of
court distinguished
60
the settlor.
In 1956, in Hanson v. Denckla,01 the Florida Supreme Court was
presented with the question of the validity of a purported inter vivos
trust without the intervention of any issues involving dower or homestead rights. In fact, the court, although citing Williams v. Collier,
vivos trust such as this is a
stated, "the validity of an attempted inter
2
matter of first impression in this state."
The trust instrument reserved to 'the settlor the following rights and
powers: (1) life estate in the income, (2) power to amend or revoke the
trust in whole or in part, (3) power to change the trustee, (4) power to
designate and change the "advisor" (certain powers of the trustee could
by him only with the consent or at the direction of the
be exercised
"advisor"), 63 and (5) power of appointment by deed or will.
4
In her will the testatrix-settlor provided,6
all the .. .residue and remainder of my estate, . . . including
any and all property, rights and interests over which I may have
power of appointment which prior to my death has not been effectively exercised by me ... , I direct my Executrix to deal
with as follows ....[Partially italicized in court's opinion.]
The issue before the court involved the determination of the testamentary or nontestamentary character of the trust and consequently
whether the power of appointment had been effectively exercised or
whether the corpus of the trust passed under the residuary clause of the
will. The court quoted extensively from the original Restatement of
Trusts. Insight into the court's reasoning can be gleaned from an examination of its analysis of the illustrations in the Restatement.3
59. Id. at 256, 158 So. at 817.
60. See text at note 52 supra.
61. 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956), reo'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
conformed to, 106 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1958). The same case was tried in the Delaware
courts which upheld the trust. Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819
(1957), aflrmfng Hanson v. Wilmington, Trust Co., 35 Del. Ch.411, 119 A.2d 901
(1955), aff'd Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
62. 100 So. 2d at 383.
63. The advisor, who was the settlor's husband, had to give his written consent
before the trustee could exercise certain enumerated powers. Ibid.
64. 100 So. 2d at 380, 381.
65. 100 So. 2d at 384.
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Appellants contend that Illustration 8 under Subsection g. of
[Section 56 of the original Restatement of Trusts] is "exactly our
case." This illustration reads as follows:
8. A transfers certain securities to B in trust to pay the
income to A for life and upon A's death to convey the
securities to such person as may be designated in a letter
to be delivered by A to B on the following day. On the following day A delivers a letter to B designating C as the
person entitled to receive the securities on A's death. A
valid trust for C is created, since an interest passes to C
during the life of A.
The above illustration represents the instant trust in some particulars, but is an oversimplification of 'the facts before us. It relates to a single exercise of a power of appointment, rather than
frequently revoked and amended exercises of power, such as appear in the case before us, which would demonstrate that the
settlor considered the appointments to be ambulatory in nature
and exactly like successive wills and codicils in their operation.
The court emphasized that the sefflor exercised the power of appointment several times. The power was initially exercised one month
after 'the creation of the trust in 1935. Subsequent amendments to the
power of appointment were executed in 1939, in 1949-on the same day
the settlor executed her will-and again in 1950. The court, in its analysis
of the illustration from the Restatement of Trusts, implies that the question whether a present interest passes to a beneficiary is not to be
determined as of the time that the beneficiary is appointed, but rather
depends upon whether the appointment is amended or partially revoked.
This line of reasoning would lead to the conclusion that any amendment
or revocation of a power of appointment after the initial exercise will
place the remainder in jeopardy. The Florida Supreme Court indicated
the remainder was invalid under both possible approaches: no interest
passed to a beneficiary during the life of the settlor, and a mere agency
agreement was intended. When the same case was presented to the
Delaware Supreme Court, that court found no invalidity on either of
these grounds. 66
66. The Delaware court held that the exercise of the power of appointment
created immediate interests, and the right to revoke or change the appointment
merely subjected the interests to possible defeasance. Rejecting the Florida court's
reasoning, the court further held that the right to revoke or modify did not create a
mere agency agreement even though joint action of the settlor and the trustee was
required in some instances. Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 253, 128 A.2d 819,

830 (1957).
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The Florida court noted that the illustration quoted above did not
deal with the element of control. The court went on to quote section 57,
comment g, of the original Restatement of Trusts. It is noteworthy to
compare the position taken in section 57 of the original Restatement
with that taken in the same section of the second Restatement.67 The
language used in the former was based primarily on McEvoy v. Boston
Five Cents Savings Bank,68 whereas the language of the latter reflects
the holding of National Shawmut Bank v. Joy,69 which expressly overruled McEvoy. Notwithstanding the wording of the original Restatement, Professor Scott states "even under the rule as there stated most
courts would probably have held that a trust and not a mere agency was
created in [Hanson v. Denckla], as, indeed, the Delaware court did,
70
citing the original Restatement."
Hanson V. Dencklq, as decided by the Florida Supreme Court not
only represents the minority view in the United States, but is difficult to
support. The formal requirements of the wills statutes are intended to
prevent fraudulent claims against the estate of a decedent. It is well
established that an inter vivos trust instrument need not be executed
with the formalities required for a will even though the settlor reserves
a life interest and a power to revoke or amend the trust.7 ' Fraudulent
67. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS §57(2) (1935), reads as follows: "Where the settlor
transfers property in trust and reserves not only a beneficial life estate and a power
to revoke and modify the trust but also such power to control the trustee as to the
details of the administration of the trust that the trustee is the agent of the settlor,
the disposition so far as it is intended to take effect after his death is testamentary
and is invalid unless the requirements of the statutes relating to the validity of wills
are complied with."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §57 (1959) reads as follows: "Where an
interest in the trust property is created in a beneficiary other than the settlor, the
disposition is not testamentary and invalid for failure to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Wills merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial life
interest or because he reserves in addition a power to revoke the trust in whole or in
part, and a power to modify the trust, and a power to control the trustee as to the
administration of the trust."
68. 201 Mass. 50, 87 N.E. 465 (1909).
69. 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944).
70. Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HAIv. L. REv. 695 n.5 at 697-98 (1959).
Professor Scott continues: "Such a power of appointment is very commonly reserved
by the settlor of an inter vivos trust. It seems clear that the reservation of such a
power does not make the trust invalid as a testamentary disposition, and that the
exercise of the power inter vivos is valid although not fulfilling the requirements for
a will. It is true that in the instant case any such appointment was revocable under
the terms of the trust. But that does not make the disposition testamentary, just as
the fact that a trust is revocable does not make it testamentary. By the exercise of
the power an interest is created in the appointees, and the disposition is not testamentary merely because that interest might have been later taken away."
71. See text at note 46 supra.
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claims do not present any greater danger merely because the settlor also
reserves powers of control over the trustee as to the administration of
the trust and a power of appointment exercisable only by an instrument
executed and signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee. This is
especially true when, as in the instant case, there is a formal trust instrument and a corporate trustee.
The most recent Florida case in this area is Watson v. St. Petersburg
Bank & Trust Co. 72 The settlor conveyed certain property to the purported trustee under an instrument containing, among others, the following provisions:
(1) power to revoke the trust in whole or in part was retained by
the settlor and the settr'Ws successors in interest;
(2) power to require the trustee at any time to convey the trust
property to such persons as the settlor or his successors in interest
might appoint was reserved;
(3) the beneficiary was given a possessory interest in the trust
property; and
(4) the only duty of the trusted was to hold title 'to the trust
property until it was conveyed free of the trust.
The Second District Court of Appeal held that the terms of the purported trust agreement failed to show an intent on the part of the settlor
to create a trust and therefore the conveyances were a nullity because
73
no valid trust was created. The court stated:
While neither the reservation of a power to revoke the trust and
take back the res nor the retention of a power to modify the trust
and change the beneficiaries in themselves make the trust nugatory, they are elements to be considered. The power of the trustor
to direct conveyances of the property to any person is an element
contrary to a trust intent. Normally, the trustor does not provide
that the beneficiary shall have a possessory interest; however, it
is possible for him to permit the beneficiary to enjoy the trust
property directly, although under the supervision of the trustee.
Indicating that the arrangement created was more characteristic of
an agency or bailment 7 4 the court stated: "As was the case in Hansen
[sic] v. Denckia . . . .the cumulative effect of the reservations made
7
the trust illusory." 5
The Watson case provides little if any additional insight into the
anticipated position of the Florida courts on the extent of permissible
72. 146 So. 2d883 (2d D.C.A. 1962).
73. Id. at 385.

74. See notes 43 and 47 supra.
75. 146 So. 2d at 386. (Emphasis added.)
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reservation of dominion and control by a settlor of a revocable inter
vivos trust. This is particularly true because of the rather extensive and
unusual reservations present in the Watson case; especially the reservation of the powers of revocation and appointment to the settlor's successors in interest.
What then are the implications of these cases; to what extent can a
settlor of an inter vivos trust in Florida retain control over the trust
property without fear of nullifying his post-death intentions? The courts,
in Hanson v. Denckla and Watson v. St. PetersburgBank & Trust Co.,
correctly recognized that it is the cumulative effect of the reservation of
various powers that may cause the intended disposition to fail.70 Herein
lies the difficulty of trying to analyze the position of the Florida courts.
Initially, an examination should be made of the minimum controls
that the settlor can reserve with almost absolute assurance that the transfer will be sustained as a non-testamentary trust. Certainly the settlor
can retain an interest in the income for life. 77 The "pour-over" statute7"
implies that a revocable or amendable trust will be operative, and this
is true whether or not the trust has been amended or revoked in part.
Presumably the same result will obtain if the settlor reserves a life interest coupled with the power to amend or revoke. 79
The court's analysis, in Hanson v. Denckla, of the illustration in the
Restatement of Trusts,80 indicates that a single exercise of a power of
appointment will not be fatal. If the settlor wishes to retain a power of
appointment over a revocable inter vivos trust, and after the first exercise thereof wishes to amend or revoke the appointment, prudence
would suggest that the settlor revoke the entire trust. A new trust should
then be created designating the new appointee as the taker in default of
appointment.
The power to designate a new trustee on the death, resignation, or
removal of the existing trustee, otherwise than at the discretion of the
settlor, should not be a fatal addition to the above powers. But what of
the power to change the trustee at will, or the power to directly or indirectly control the trustee's administration of the trust? The suggestion

76. In Hanson v. Dencla, the court stated, "We re-emphasize that we do not,
and need not, hold that the reservation of the power of appointment, or any other
factor standing alone, would suffice to invalidate the remainder interests sought to
be created under this trust." 100 So. 2d at 885. (Emphasis added.)
77. Williams v. Collier, 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815 (1935).
78. FLA.STAT. §736.17(2) (a), (b) (1961). See APPENDIX.
79. In Hanson v. Denckla, the court assumed that a life interest coupled with a
power to revoke would not invalidate the remainder. This assumption was, however,
based on an incorrect interpretation of the facts in Williams v. Collier. See note 57
supra. See also text at note 46 supra.
80. See text at note 65 supra.
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in the preceding paragraph connotes the incongruity of the position of
the Florida court at least so far as a power of appointment is concerned.
If the settlor can accomplish an intended result by revocation and reconstitution of a trust, why should he be prohibited from accomplishing
the same result by a written instrument directing the trustee to change
the appointees? Although the same reasoning-that a power to amend or
revoke should encompass the lesser powers-might be applied to the retention of the power to change the trustee at will or to direct the trustee
in certain administrative functions, it is doubtful that such a contention
would be sustained by the courts of Florida.
Until the exact position of the law in Florida is clearly delineated by
the courts or preferably by statute, prudence would dictate that a settlor
of a revocable inter vivos trust in Florida retain no more than the total
of the following rights and powers:
(1) life estate in the income;
(2) power to amend or revoke the trust in whole or in part;
(3) power to designate a new trustee on the death, resignation,
incapacity, or removal of the existing trustee otherwise than at the
discretion of the settlor; and
(4) power of appointment by deed or will. (But such a power
should be exercised no more than once if at all.)
A ProposedStatutory Solution
The question, under what circumstances will a purported inter vivos
trust be invalid because of its testamentary character, can most advantageously be answered by the legislature.8 1 As indicated above, when
such trusts are held testamentary, it is because of the cumulative effect
of the reservation of various powers over the trust property or the
trustee. For this reason, the desired degree of certainty in this area can
be achieved through judicial pronouncement only after the Florida
courts have passed on the myriad of possible combinations of retained
powers, and even then, the extent of the permissible powers probably
will be quite limited. Hanson v. Denckla and the other cases discussed
above leave much of the area in the realm of speculation at this time.
The time is propitious for the Florida legislature to enact a statute
that would provide the estate planner and the draftsman of trust instruments with a greater amount of certainty, and accordingly, this author
submits for consideration the proposed statute set out below. It is not
contended that such a statute is a panacea for all possible factual situations that might arise. Beyond a certain point, judicial flexibility is
81. As yet only one state has enacted a statute in this area. Wis.
(1961).
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desirable. This proposed statute specifies certain powers that may be
reserved by the settlor or granted to another person without fear that
the trust may, upon the death of the settlor, be held invalid as a testa82
mentary disposition.
If the settlor wishes to retain or to grant powers beyond those specified in the proposed statute, he should be apprised of the fact that if the
trust is attacked it might be held invalid. If powers other than those
specified in the proposed statute are retained, it is contemplated that the
courts will follow the common-law approach and view the cumulative
effect of all such powers, including any specified in the statute.
Admittedly, the proposed statute would enable the settlor to retain
or to grant extensive powers. However, this would not extend the permissible powers of the settlor beyond what they now are under the common law in many jurisdictions.8 3 The proposed statute would introduce
desired flexibility into the planning of estates in Florida. As has been
noted, such a statute would not seriously undermine the policy of the
wills statutes. The proposed statute would require a formal written
instrument and a trust that would take effect during the life of the
settlor.
Consideration might also be given to the advisability of amending
the "pour-over" statute84 to permit a pour-over from a will to any trust
that would not be testamentary under the proposed statute. It is arguable, however, that a trust capable of receiving a pour-over from the
settloer's will should not be subject to the extensive reservations of control that may be acceptable in the case of other inter vivos trusts.
The proposed statute reads as follows:
(1) An otherwise valid trust, created by a written instrument,
shall not be held invalid as a testamentary disposition for any or all of
the following reasons:
(a) because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to revoke or amend, alter, or modify the
trust in whole or in part;
(b) because the settlor or another person or both possess 'the power to appoint by deed or by will or by either,
the persons and organizations to whom the income shall
be paid or the principal distributed;
82. It is contemplated that the court, in Hanson v. Denckla, would have held
the trust a nontestamentary disposition had the proposed statute been in force.
83. See RESTATmmNT (SFcoND), TRUSTS §§56, 57 (1959); 1 ScoTr, Tirusrs
§§56, 57 (2d ed. 1956).
84. See APPENDIX. The Wisconsin statute, note 81 supra, incorporates a pourover provision into the statute providing for the nontestamentary character of certain
trusts.
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(c) because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to add to, or withdraw from, the trust all or
any part of the principal or income at one time or at different times;
(d) because the settlor or another person or both possess 'the power to remove trustees and appoint successor
trustees;
(e) because the settlor or another person or both possess the power to control the trustee in the administration
of the trust;
(f) because the settlor has retained the right to receive all or part of the income of the trust during his life or
for any part thereof.
(2) The fact that the powers specified in subsection (1) are
exercised more than once shall not affect the validity of the trust or
its nontestamentary character.
(3) This act shall take effect immediately upon the date the
same becomes law and shall be applicable to trusts executed before
or after said date by persons who are living on or after said date.
MA=TAL PiGnrs OF =

S

OR's SURvniNG SPousE

Upon the death of the settlor of an inter vivos trust, his surviving
spouse may attempt to assert her marital rights against the trust property."" It is generally held that the surviving spouse has no rights in
property conveyed by her husband to an irrevocable inter vivos trust.8 6
If the trust is revocable, three divergent views are possible:
(1) the trust may be declared wholly nugatory as a testamentary
disposition;
(2) the trust may be wholly effective and beyond the claims of
the surviving spouse; or
(3) the trust may be otherwise valid but treated, at the election
of the surviving spouse, as a testamentary disposition so far as is
necessary to satisfy the spouse's marital rights.
The first possibility has been discussed in the preceding section. A
court may consider the effect of the conveyance on the marital rights of
the spouse merely as additional evidence bearing on the testamentary
character of the disposition. A trust may be held testamentary solely on
the grounds that the conveyance was a fraud on the spouse's rights.
85. For a collection of cases dealing with such rights of the surviving spouse,
see CASNiE,

ESTATE PLANNING 114 n.18 (3d ed. 1961).

86. See 1 ScoTT, TnUSTS §57.5 n.3 (2d ed. 1956).
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Where the second of the above results is reached, it is usually based on a
literal reading of the governing law which states that the surviving
spouse's rights attach only to property owned by the deceased spouse
at death, and property conveyed inter vivos without the surviving
spouse's relinquishment of her marital rights if such relinquishment is
required. Courts which fall into the third category attempt to strike a
balance between two conflicting policies:
(1) each spouse has a right to freely dispose of his property inter
vivos since the surviving spouses rights attach only on death of the
first spouse; and
(2) one should not be permitted to circumvent the public policy
protecting the surviving spouse and at the same time retain substantial ownership of the property until death.
In Florida, a widow's statutory dower rights consist of a fee simple in
one-third of all realty, except homestead, owned by her husband at the
time of his death, or which he had previously conveyed without relinquishment of her dower rights. In addition, the widow is entitled to one87
third of all personalty owned by her husband at the time of his death.
If a married man dies intestate, his widow may elect either dower or
the statutory share. Because the latter entitled the widow to take equally
with the lineal descendants as if she were a child, it may be more or less
advantageous than dower, depending on the number of lineal descendants and/or the amount of claims against her husband's estate.8 8 In cases
wherein a surviving spouse has sought to assert her marital rights against
property transferred inter vivos by her deceased spouse, the courts of
many jurisdictions analyze the disposition in terms of what might be
called the "illusory" test, while other courts, or the same courts in other
cases, use the "fraud" test. When a court speaks in terms of an illusory
transfer, the test applied is whether the transferor has divested himself
of the ownership of the property transferred.8 9 The so-called "fraud" test
directs itself to the intent and purpose of the transferor to deprive his
surviving spouse of property she would otherwise acquire at his death. 0
The Florida Supreme Court, as will be seen in the discussion that
follows, has applied both the "fraud" and the "illusory" tests, depending
87. FLA.STAT. §731.34 (1961).
88. FLA. STAT. §731.23(1) (1961). The statutory share is available to either the
surviving husband or wife, whereas there is no provision for curtesy for the surviving
husband.
89. The leading case following this line of analysis is Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y.
371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). See Annot., 112 A.L.R. 643 (1956).
90. See, e.g., Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947). See
also Nat'l Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950),
wherein both the "illusory" and the "fraud" tests are discussed. See Annot. 49
A.L.R.2d 521 (1956).
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upon the particular facts in the case before it. Often the court does not
phrase its opinion in terms of "fraud" or "illusory," but the theories remain the same.91 Therefore, the estate planner in Florida must be mindful of the fundamental objections underlying both of these theories.
The Florida courts have had little opportunity to examine a widow's
rights in property conveyed by her deceased husband to an inter vivos
trust. Three of the relevant cases have already been explored in another
92
context in the preceding section of this article.
Smith v. Hines 3 first established, by way of dictum, the proposition
that a man may sell or give his personal property away even for the
avowed purpose of defeating his wife's dower interest therein, "but such
sale or gift must be a bona fide one-not a sham or pretence of a sale or
gift .. . ."04 The court held that the inter vivos conveyance was not bona
fide because the deceased never parted with absolute dominion and
control over the property.90 'Bona fide," as used in this context, directs
itself to the settlor's good faith in divesting himself of substantial control
and dominion over the property during his lifetime, rather than the lack
of intent to deprive his wife of her marital rights in his property.
Smith v. Hines raises the crucial question: What constitutes a bona
fide conveyance sufficient to defeat a widow's claim of dower in Florida?
The relevant considerations were set out in Williams v. Collier,9"
wherein the court distinguished Smith v. Hines on the grounds that in
Smith, "the husband designed by subterfuge to deprive his wife of her
dower rights when she was not properly provided for from his property." 7 The court pointed out that in Williams ample provision had
been made for the widow; the trust was created in good faith for a
laudable purpose; 98 and the testator had effectively divested himself of
title to and control over the property transferred to the trust.99

In Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon,10 0 the court denied an attempt by
91. Smith v. Hines, discussed at note 93 infra, wherein the court spoke in terms
of the "bona fides" of the transfer; and Johns v. Bowden, discussed at note 101
infra, would most appropriately be classffied as cases involving illusory transfers,
although in Smith the court also speaks in terms of fraud. Williams v. Collier, discussed at note 96 infra; and Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, discussed at note 100
infra, are based on a finding of the lack of a fraudulent intent on the part of the
transferor.
92. Smith v. Hines, supra note 48, Johns v. Bowden, supranote 58, and Williams
v. Collier, supra note 56.
93. 10 Fla. 258 (1863).
94. Id. at 285.
95. See text at note 50 supra.
96. 120 Fla. 248, 158 So. 815 (1935).
97. Id. at 258, 158 So. 818.
98. The trust was created for the benefit of the settloer's grandchildren.
99. Note that in this case the trust was irrevocable. See note 57 supra.
100. 44 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1949).
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the settlor's wife to void her husband's transfer of certain stock to an
irrevocable inter vivos trust that had been established for the benefit of
his niece and nephews. The settlor, although sane at the time of the
transfer, was insane when the suit was commenced. The court relied
heavily on Williams v. Collier, and distinguished Smith v. Hines on the
grounds that there, the husband did not properly provide for his wife.
The court pointed out that in the instant case the plaintiff's husband,
after the transfer in trust, remained in possession of property valued at
approximately $100,000. It should be pointed out that although in both
Bee Branch Cattle Co. v. Koon, and Williams v. Collier, the trusts

were irrevocable, the court in neither case indicated that this fact was
determinative.
In Johns v. Bowden""' the testators orphan children successfully
attacked their father's conveyance of his homestead to an inter vivos
trust. The court did not approach the issue from the point of view of the
bona fides of the conveyance as did the Smith v. Hines line of cases. The
court purportedly held that the revocable inter vivos trust was testamentary in character regardless of the homestead issue. However, the
court then noted that a testamentary disposition of homestead is prohibited by law and hence nugatory.
As indicated above,10 2 the court erroneously viewed Johns as a case
in which no interest passed to any beneficiary during the life of the
settlor. Notwithstanding this fact, it is submitted that the decision is
03
altogether sound. The extensive retention of control over the property
leads inescapably to the conclusion that the testator intended to circumvent the statutory and constitutional restrictions on testamentary disposition of homestead, and at the same time, treated the property as his
own during his lifetime. The testator's dominion over the property was
virtually unchanged after the alleged conveyance in trust. At most, a
mere agency arrangement was created for the purpose of benefiting
some of his children at the expense of the others.
To what extent then may a man deprive his wife or children of their
statutory rights by a conveyance of property to a revocable inter vivos
trust? Clearly the cases discussed give no definitive answer. They do
however, establish broad guidelines. The Florida court has obviously
attempted to strike a balance between two extreme positions. At one
extreme is a rule that denies the surviving spouse's rights under all circumstances in which a literal reading of the statute does not afford her
protection, thus seriously undermining the policy of these statutes. At
the other extreme is a rule 'that so severely limits the husband's disposi101. 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155 (1914).
102. See text at note 54 supra.
103. See text at note 53 supra.
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five powers that it casts doubt upon the validity of most inter vivos gifts
of personalty or homestead not joined in by his wife. As is the case with
most broad legal standards, especially when they are articulated in
rather vague terms, it is difficult to predict the results of a given course
of action.
The Florida legislature should consider the advisability of a statute
which would bring greater certitude to this area. 0 4 Such a statute might
provide that the surviving spouse or children may assert their statutory
rights against any property over which the testator had, during his lifetime, a power 'to vest in himself the beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Such a statute might be considered in conjunction with the proposed
statute in the preceding section.'0 5

104. For an example of a statute which delineates the rights of a surviving spouse
in property conveyed by her husband to an inter vivos trust, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, §301.11 (Supp. 1961).
105. A statute might also be considered which would delineate the rights of the
settloer's creditors in the revocable inter vivos trust property. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL
PRop. LAw, §145, which reads, "Where the grantor in a conveyance reserves to
himself for his own benefit, an absolute power of revocation, he is to be still deemed
the absolute owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and
purchasers are concerned."
The only Florida statute which deals with creditors' rights in this context is F.A.
STAT. §726.01 (1961), which allows creditors to avoid fraudulent conveyances by
their debtor. In 3 ScoTr, TRusTS §330.12 n.8 (2d ed. 1956), and in the annotations
to RESTATmEiNT (SEcoND), TnUsrs §330 comment o (1959), it is implied that FLA.
STAT. §726.08 (1961), protects the rights of creditors of a settlor of a revocable
trust. It would seem however, that this statute applies not to general creditors, but
rather to subsequent purchasers.
Because there are no reported Florida cases that deal with the general rights of
creditors in property conveyed by their debtor to an inter vivos trust, a separate
section of this paper will not be devoted to this problem.
The creditors of the settlor of a revocable inter vivos trust generally cannot reach

the trust property merely because the trust is revocable.

lEsTATm ENT

(SEcoND),

ThrusTs §330 comment o (1959); 3 Scorr, TRusTS §330.12 (2d ed. 1956).

It is generally held that if the settlor reserves to himself the income for life, his
creditors can at least reach his beneficial interest in the income. 2 Sco-r, TnusTs
§156 (2d ed. 1956). If the settlor retains a general power to appoint the principal of
the trust, his creditors generally will be able to reach the entire trust property
whether or not the settlor exercises the power. kESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§156 (1959); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §156 (1956). In one Florida case the settlor conveyed
property in trust, reserving to himself the income for life and a power of appointment. There was no provision for a gift over in default of appointment. The court
held that the settlor was the sole beneficiary and his creditors could reach the entire
trust property. First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v. Schwab, 141 Fla. 748,
194 So. 307 (1940). See also Adams v. Adams, 147 Fla. 267, 2 So. 2d 885 (1941).
See generally REsTATEMNT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§156, 330 (1959); 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS §156 (2d ed. 1956); 3 Scoar, TRUSTS §330 (2d ed. 1956). See also Bankruptcy Act, §70(a) (3), 30 Stat. 565 (1939), 11 USC §110 (1958).
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Until such a statute is enacted, or until the Florida courts delineate
more definitive rules, the following vague standards will control:
(1) the conveyance must be bona fide-the grantor must divest
himself of legal title and substantial dominion and control over the
property conveyed;
(2) the grantor's wife or children must be "amply" provided for
from his other assets; and
(3) the conveyance must be for a "proper" and 'audable"
06
purpose.,
CONCLUSION

In order to effectuate the desires of his client, the estate planner
who advises the use of a revocable inter vivos trust must be thoroughly
familiar with the limitations placed on such a device in the jurisdiction
whose laws are to govern the disposition. This is especially true if a
revocable inter vivos trust is to be created in Florida. If the trust is to be
the subject of a pour-over from the settlor's will, the statutory requirements must be met, and the trust should be adequately funded. Care
must be taken to assure that the settlor has not retained such dominion
and control over the trust property or the operation of the trust as to
subject the arrangement to attack on the grounds that it is in reality a
testamentary disposition. The estate planner must be mindful of the
fact that inadequate provision for the settlor's spouse and children,
either from the trust itself or from the settlor's other assets, will render
ineffective the dispositive scheme.
A skillfully planned and properly created revocable inter vivos trust
can be a useful and desirable instrument in the planning of many estates.
As has been noted, the advantages of such trusts are numerous. Of paramount importance is the realization that such trusts may add greater
flexibility to a dispositive plan and thus enable the estate planner to
more effectively accomplish the desires of his client, which, after all,
should be the ultimate goal of the estate planner.

106. For cases involving confutation of prenuptial conveyances alleged to be in
fraud of the wife's marital rights, see Davis v. Davis, 98 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1957);
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 92 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1956) (discussed in Davis v. Davis,
supra, at 778); Lange v. Lange, 183 Fla. 447, 182 So. 807 (1938). See also note, 11
U. FLA. L. REv. 321 (1958).
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APPENDIX
§786.17 (1961): "Bequests and devises to trustee.
(1) An otherwise valid bequest or devise may be made to the trustee of a trust
which is evidenced by a written instrument subscribed concurrently with the making
of the will, provided that such written instrument is identified in the will.
(2) Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid for any or all of the following
reasons:
(a) Because the trust is amendable or revocable or both by any person
whomsoever; or
(b) Because the trust has been amended or revoked in part after execution
of the will or codicil thereto; or
(c) Because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required for wills; or
(d) Because the possible expectancy of receiving benefits as named beneficiary of a life insurance policy deposited, or to be deposited with the trustee is
the only trust res, and even though the testator or other person has reserved any
or all rights of ownership in such insurance contracts, including the right to
change the beneficiary.
(3) Such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of property under the terms
of the instrument which created the trust as theretofore or thereafter amended.
(4) An entire revocation of the trust by ai instrument in writing prior to the
testator's death shall invalidate the devise or bequest.
(5) Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed
shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the testator and thus shall not
be subject to the terms of Chapter 787, Florida trust accounting law, but shall
become a part of the principal of the trust to which it is devised or bequeathed.
(6) This section shall not be construed as repealing or amendatory of, but as
cumulative to, all laws touching upon the subject matter hereof and now in force
and effect.
(7) This act shall take effect immediately upon the date the same becomes law
and shall be applicable to wills executed before and after said date by persons who
are living on or after said date."
FLA. STAT.

The original FLA. STAT. §786.17 as enacted in 1959 was less comprehensive than
the present statute set out above. The original statute read as follows:
"An otherwise valid bequest or devise may be made to the trustee of a trust
in existence at the date of the execution of the will. Such devise or bequest shall not
be invalid: (1) Because the trust is amendable or revocable or both by any person
whomsoever; or (2) Because the trust has been amended or revoked in part after
execution of the will or codicil; or (3) Because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required for wills.
"Such devise or bequest shall operate to dispose of property under the terms of
the instrument which created the trust as theretofore or thereafter amended."
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